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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

TRACEY EUGENE SMITH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No.980056-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to
withdraw his 1988 guilty plea to one count of criminal homicide, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-201, 76-5-202(1 )(d) (Supp. 1985), in the Fifth
Judicial District Court, Beaver County, Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996) (permitting the Supreme Court to transfer jurisdiction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the lower court properly refuse to re-examine defendant's previously
litigated claims?

1

2. Did the lower court correctly dismiss defendant's motion to withdraw as
frivolous?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
It is well established that withdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a
right, which is "within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Gallegos. 738 P.2d
1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will only be
disturbed on appeal if it appears the court has abused its discretion. State v. Holland, 921
P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996); State v. Thorup. 841 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah App. 1990). To
find an abuse of discretion, the appellate court must determine that the lower court acted
beyond the bounds of reasonability. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).
An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's determination that the defendant has not
shown good cause "unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion."
State v. Trujillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The text of any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes or rules is
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1988, defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, a capital
offense (R. 2). Defendant conditionally pled guilty, reserving the right to withdraw the

2

plea if sentenced to death (R. 23-27). The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison,
with a twenty-year incarceration recommendation (R. 30-31).
For the past ten years, the defendant has filed numerous motions attempting
to withdraw his plea, claiming that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, that
his sentence was illegal, and that the court erred during sentencing. These motions have
all been denied.
On July 28, 1997, defendant filed a self-styled "Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea and Correct Illegal Sentence" (R. 219), which the lower court denied (R. 266-70;
Addendum A). Defendant then filed a "Motion of reconcideration [sic] of defendants [sic]
motion to withdraw guilty plea, and correct illegal sentence" (R. 271-74), which was also
denied (R. 282-87). Defendant timely filed this appeal (R. 288).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 3, 1988, defendant murdered James Glen Bray in a rest stop
restroom during an attempted robbery (R. 2). Defendant was charged with murder in the
first degree, a capital offense, in violation of §§ 76-5-201 and 76-5-202 (l)(d) (Supp.
1985), in that defendant committed homicide with a firearm while engaged in the
commission of, or attempt to commit, an aggravated robbery or robbery (R. 2-3).
On November 14, 1988, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder in
exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment and an agreement by the State not to
recommend the death penalty (R. 26). Defendant was represented by court-appointed
3

counsel James L. Shumate. Defendant expressly waived his right to a jury trial and
submitted himself to the court for sentencing, specifically acknowledging that the trial
court maintained complete discretion over the sentence, regardless of any recommendation
by the parties. (R. 24; 27) Defendant reserved the right to withdraw his plea only if he
were sentenced to death (R.23-29).

The trial court informed defendant: of the

constitutional rights he was waiving; of the consequences of pleading guilty; of the
applicable law; and of the right to appeal and the pertinent deadlines for an appeal (R. 4655). The trial court also ensured that defendant was fully aware of the ramifications of
pleading guilty (id.). On November 22, 1988, the trial court sentenced defendant to life
in prison and recommended that "the Defendant not be allowed parole or even be
considered for parole until he has served at least Twenty (20) years" (R. 30-31).
On December 22, 1988, defendant filed, pro se, a "notice of belated appeal"
from the judgment, partially claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 33-38).
Defendant later voluntarily withdrew this motion (R. 86).
Defendant's First Motion to Withdraw
Three years later, on December 4, 1991, defendant, pro se, filed a motion
to withdraw guilty plea [hereinafter "motion to withdraw"] (R. 100-01). On February 20,
1992, the trial court denied the motion (R. 150-54). Defendant filed an appeal to the State
Supreme Court (R. 185-86). On appeal, defendant raised several issues that his courtappointed counsel, Craig S. Cook, considered to be without merit. However, appellate
4

counsel found several grounds for appeal, including issues based on sentencing, that had
not been presented to the lower court. I(L In denying the motion to withdraw, the Supreme
Court declined to rule on the sentencing issues as they were raised for the first time on
appeal (R. 185-86; State v. Smith. 866 P.2d 532 (Utah 1993)). The Court, however,
found that sentencing issues could be addressed in the pending post-conviction petition
(discussed below). Smith. 866 P.2d at 533.
State Post-Conviction Petition
On December 4, 1992, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
[hereinafter "petition for post-conviction relief] in the Utah Supreme Court alleging that
he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel (R. 185). The Supreme Court
referred the petition to the Third District Court (Smith v. Galetka. No. 930900217).
On November 22, 1993, after an evidentiary hearing, the Third District
Court denied defendant's request for post-conviction relief (R. 217; see also Addendum
B). The post-conviction court made the following findings of fact that are germane to
defendant's present motion:
12.

Prior to being sentenced, petitioner knew that he faced
a maximum of life imprisonment.

13.

By entering a guilty plea, petitioner avoided the death
penalty, which was his primary objective in pleading
guilty.

5

14.

A condition of the plea bargain was that petitioner
would have been able to withdraw his plea if the trial
court had imposed the death penalty.

15.

[Trial counsel] correctly advised petitioner that the
Court would almost certainly impose a sentence up to
and including life imprisonment.

16.

[Trial counsel] opined to petitioner that he might spend
five to seven years in prison.

17.

[Trial counsel] correctly advised petitioner that the
length of time he would actually serve in prison was
under the exclusive control of the Board of Pardons,
which would be greatly influenced petition's conduct
while in prison.

18.

The trial judge's 20-year recommendation is not a
major factor relied on by the Board of Pardons in
setting parole rehearing dates. Such recommendations
are accorded greater or lesser weight depending upon
their factual support. The judge's recommendation here
was based solely on the facts of the crime itself.

19.

Defendants who have pled guilty to the capital offense
of first degree murder ordinarily receive 20 to 25 year
rehearing date from the Board of Pardons.

20.

On November 12, 1991, petitioner went before the
Utah Board of Pardons for an original parole grant
hearing. Petitioner was given a rehearing date of
October, 2008.

21.

The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for
setting a 20-year rehearing date. The reasons included
petitioner's prison misconduct, but did not include the
judge's recommendation.

6

22.

Petitioner has the right to petition the Board of Pardons
for an earlier rehearing date.

23.

The State's case against petitioner was strong, based
upon eyewitness testimony and the testimony of
petitioner's companion, Timothy Miller.

24.

[Trial counsel] testified that petitioner confessed to him
that his purpose in approaching the victim was to obtain
money, by violent means if necessary, and that he shot
the victim without provocation.

25.

Had petitioner known that the judge was going to
recommend 20 years incarceration, petitioner might still
have pled guilty.

26.

Petitioner never testified that but for his counsel's
alleged deficiencies, petitioner would not have pled
guilty but would have insisted upon going to trial.

(See Addendum B).
The post-conviction court's conclusions of law further resolve the issues that
defendant presented before the lower court in his current motion to withdraw:
3.

[Trial counsel's] representation was more than
adequate; it did not fall below an objective standard or
reasonableness.

4.

Even if [trial counsel] committed error, petitioner has
failed to demonstrate prejudice.

5.

Petitioner was well aware when he pled guilty that he
faced a life sentence.
• • •

7.

Petitioner has failed to show that he would have
received a lesser sentence if [trial counsel] had
requested a presentence investigation report, called
7

mitigating witnesses, or made a statement on
petitioner's behalf at sentencing.
8.

The Board of Pardons is not bound by the trial court's
20-year recommendation. There is no support for
petitioner's claim that, had [trial counsel] objected to
the 20-year recommendation, petitioner would have
received a lesser sentence and/or an earlier rehearing
date.

LL
Defendant did not appeal the post-conviction court's decision.
Motion to Correct Sentence
On May 15, 1996, defendant filed a pro se motion alleging that his sentence
was illegal and requesting an order to modify the sentence (R. 203-05) The trial court
denied defendant's motion, and the Court of Appeals upheld this ruling in a memorandum
decision filed April 3, 1997 (R. 217-18; Addendum C). The Court of Appeals held that
the determinative issues presented by defendant were resolved in the unappealed postconviction ruling (R. 217).
Second Motion to Withdraw
On July 28, 1997, defendant again filed in the trial court a "motion to
withdraw guilty plea and correct illegal sentence." In this motion, defendant alleged that
he was unconstitutionally confined because the trial court "erred by not personally advising
the defendant on record that any sentencing agreement or recommendation the defendant
had with prosecution [was] not binding on the court" (R. 224). Additionally, defendant
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implicitly argued that his trial counsel was ineffective in not fully apprizing him of the
ramifications of the sentencing recommendation (R. 225). To support this untimely
contention, defendant argued that advice from prison contract attorneys and "jail house
lawyers" constituted new evidence sufficient to establish 'good cause' to bring the belated
motion (R. 227). On August 25, 1997, the lower court denied defendant's motion on
several grounds, including a lack of new evidence, a lack of a merit, a running of the
statute of limitation, and prior determinations of similar issues (R. 266-70; Addendum A).
On September 5, 1997, defendant filed a "Motion of reconcideration [sic] of
defendants [sic] motion to withdraw guilty plea, and correct illegal sentence" (R. 271-74).
In the interests of judicial economy, defendant asked the lower court to reconsider the
previous motion on the basis that the court erred in overlooking the ineffectiveness of trial
and appellate counsel. kL Defendant also averred that the trial court had failed to
properly apply the law. IcL This motion was subsequently dismissed by the trial court (R.
282-87). Defendant now appeals that ruling.
On appeal, defendant alleges that the lower court erred in dismissing the
successive motion to withdraw for noncompliance with the statute of limitations.
Defendant also claims that appellate counsel's ineffectiveness provides adequate unusual
circumstances to excuse procedural bar and present his claims. Finally, defendant argues
that trial counsel was ineffective during the plea and sentencing.
contentions fails.
9

Each of these

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has addressed his current issues in prior adjudications and,
therefore, defendant is procedurally barred from advancing these claims, absent unusual
circumstances. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1037 (Utah 1989). Defendant failed to
show sufficient unusual circumstances to merit a readjudication of these issues.
Additionally, res judicata bars further redetermination of these issues. Accordingly, the
lower court correctly denied defendant's motion.
The lower court also correctly dismissed defendant's motion to withdraw as
frivolous, repetitive, and without merit. The record establishes the validity of defendant's
guilty plea, the judicial assurance that the defendant understood the consequences of the
plea, and the ultimate immateriality of the trial court's sentencing recommendation. Also,
appellate counsel effectively represented defendant on appeal from the denial of
defendant's first motion to withdraw. This appeal, therefore, is nothing more than
defendant's impermissible attempt to "frustrate the ends of justice by trying to keep cases
alive indefinitely." Wright v. Carver. 886 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1994).
Finally, the post-conviction court, after holding an evidentiary hearing, held
that trial counsel was not ineffective.

Defendant has failed to establish good cause

warranting relitigation of this issue or to otherwise excuse his failure to appeal.
Nevertheless, the record establishes the competent service provided by trial counsel.

10

Defendant's allegations fail to meet the legal standard established in Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT APPROPRIATELY
DECLINED
TO
RELITIGATE
DEFENDANT'S REPETITIVE CLAIMS
A. Res Judicata
Since defendant's current issues have been previously resolved against him,
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar relitigation. See Salt Lake Citizens
Congress v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992) (the
doctrine of res judicata prevents the relitigation of issues that have already been judicially
determined); Stevensenv. Goodson. 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996) (collateral estoppel
"prevents parties from relitigating issues resolved in a prior related action); Burleigh v.
Turner. 388 P.2d 412 (Utah 1964) (res judicata applies in habeas corpus actions).
Defendant's current claims are identical to the issues decided by the post-conviction court.
The issues in the previous action were decided in a final judgment on the merits and were
completely, fully, and fairly litigated. See Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 632
(Utah 1995). Consequently, this Court should affirm the lower court's dismissal of
defendant's motion to withdraw.
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B. Successiveness
Utah law has firmly established that "a prior adjudication of the same ground
for relief is sufficient to bar relitigation on that ground, absent unusual circumstances."
Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037. See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (barring issues that
were "raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have
been, but [were] not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief").1 "This rule
was fashioned to prevent abuse by prisoners who burden the courts and frustrate the ends
of justice by trying to keep cases alive indefinitely."

Wright, 886 P.2d at 60.

Additionally, any new claims submitted by defendant should only be entertained after a
good cause showing of why they were not addressed in a previous proceeding. See
Andrews v. Shulsen. 773 P.2d 832, 833-34 (Utah 1989), cert denied, 505 U.S. 1233
(1992); Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d 873, 878-79 (Utah 1990).
As noted by the lower court, "[defendant has had repeated opportunities to
raise this issue, including a prior motion to withdraw his plea" (R. 269; Addendum A).
Among these repeated opportunities, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief
on December 4, 1992, challenging the integrity of the twenty-year sentencing

Although the Utah Supreme court has recognized that a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea and a petition for post-conviction relief are "separate and distinct
procedures," Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037 n.8 (Utah 1989), the court has nonetheless
concluded that a motion to withdraw is a species of post-conviction remedy, and
consequently is subject to the same successiveness limitation prescribed in rule 65B,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (currently rule 65C and Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et
seq.(1996)). See State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 893-95 (Utah 1988).
12

recommendation, the knowledge of defendant in entering his plea, and the effectiveness
of counsel. (See Addendum B).
The State requests that this Court take judicial notice of the adjudicated facts
of the post-conviction ruling pursuant to rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence.2 Courts may
take judicial notice of the records and prior proceedings in the same case. See Riche v.
Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1989) (noting that courts must take judicial notice
of prior proceedings when requested and supplied with the necessary information).
Because defendant has previously litigated his current claims, they should be
"summarily denied if good cause or unusual circumstances cannot be shown." Miller v
State. 932 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah App. 1997).

Defendant alleges several "usual

circumstances" to establish "good cause" warranting relitigation of his claims. Defendant
avers: that new evidence in the form of legal advice existed; that his court-appointed
appellate counsel failed to properly perfect defendant's direct appeal; and that counsel
failed to perfect an appeal from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition (Brief of App.
at 22-24).

2

Utah courts are often reluctant to take judicial notice for the first time on appeal
absent some countervailing principle. See State v. Redd. 954 P.2d 230, 236 n. 7 (Utah
App. 1998). However, the lower court obviously relied on these prior adjudications in
dismissing defendant's motion (R. 269, 285-6). Also, appellate courts may "take notice
for the first time on appeal if doing so would permit affirmance." Mel Trimble Real
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, n.4 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 769
P.2d 819 (Utah 1988).
13

In his motion to withdraw, defendant claimed that legal advice he received
from prison counsel and "jail house lawyers" constituted significant unusual circumstances
to warrant the readjudication of these issues (R. 227). Legal advice and novel legal
theories, however, are not new evidence. See United States v. Granza. 427 F.2d 184, 186
(5th Cir. 1970) (holding that recently concocted legal theories do "not qualify as 'newly
discovered evidence'"); United States v. Hamling. 525 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir.) (finding
that "evidence will not be deemed 'newly discovered' simply because it appears in a
different light under a new theory"), cert, denied. 423 U.S. 981 (1975). New evidence
is "not evidence which was available to defendant but not obtained by him prior to the time
of trial." State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). Defendant must show that
the evidence is in reality new, that it could not have been discovered at the time the claim
was addressed. See Utah R.Civ.Pro. 65C(6). In this case, defendant's new legal theories
were surely available at sentencing. Defendant failed to present ample legal support for
this 'new evidence,' and consequently the lower court properly dismissed defendant's
claims.
Defendant's second contention may also be summarily dismissed. Appellate
counsel was appointed to represent defendant on his appeal from the denial of his
December 4, 1991 motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Smith. 866 P.2d at 532. On
appeal, counsel was limited by the issues that had been properly presented by defendant
in his pro se motion in the trial court. KL (finding that "[i]t is black-letter law that an
14

appellate court will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal except in
extraordinary circumstances that do not exist here"). However, the Utah Supreme Court
found that "[t]he grounds raised by the defendant [in the trial court were] clearly frivolous
and cannot be supported."

Id, at 533. Moreover, the Court found that the only

meritorious claims were those raised by counsel for the first time on appeal, and
subsequently in the post-conviction proceeding. IcL Counsel cannot be considered
ineffective for not raising meritless or procedurally barred issues on appeal. See Jolivet
v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1989) (finding that counsel "could not have been
deficient in not raising such a meritless claim on appeal"), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1033
(1990). Any error in not preserving meritless issues for appeal is surely not attributable
to defendant's appellate counsel.
In his motion for reconsideration and on appeal, defendant alleges that the
decision not to appeal the post-conviction ruling is attributable to appellate counsel and is
good cause to allow the presentation of those issues in this action. The claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is based on the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment's right
to counsel. See State v. Tvler, 850 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1993); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232
(Utah App. 1995). In Utah, there is "no affirmative duty to appoint counsel or to ensure
that [the defendant is] represented" in post-conviction relief. Brunerv. Carver, 920 P.2d
1153, 1158 (Utah 1996). Consequently, no ineffective assistance of counsel cause of
action should arise in a post-conviction proceeding. The United States Supreme Court has
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likewise recognized that "[b]ecause there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state
post-conviction proceedings, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel in such proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson. 501 U.S. 722, 725, 111 S. Ct.
2546, 2551 (1991) (citations omitted).
This assertion is further buttressed by the fact that "[proceedings in habeas
corpus are generally regarded as being civil in nature." Maxwell v. Turner. 435 P.2d 287,
288 (Utah 1967). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not permissible in civil
cases. See Davis v. Grand County Service Area. 905 P.2d 888, 894 (Utah App. 1995)
(finding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based on the Sixth Amendment
and have "no parallel in the civil context"). Concomitantly, the statutory language
providing for post-conviction review prescribes: "An allegation that counsel appointed
under this section was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent postconviction petition." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(3).
Furthermore, defendant has not proven that the performance of his courtappointed pro bono attorney "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" that
would support the contention that appellate counsel was ineffective. State v. Taylor. 947
P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 2061 (1984)). After the dismissal of the post-conviction petition, appellate
counsel articulated several reasons for not pursuing an appeal, ultimately determining that
the chance of success was "very slim" (Brief of App. at Attachment II). Appellate
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counsel also outlined other possible courses of action. kL Clearly, this represented a
strategic determination by counsel, and consequently should be honored by the Court. See
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (giving "trial counsel wide latitude in
making tactical decisions" and not questioning those decisions "unless there is no
reasonable basis supporting them"); Hurst. 777 P.2d at 1037 (stating that "claims that are
withheld for tactical reasons should be summarily dismissed"). Moreover, defendant has
failed to show harm or prejudice due to the alleged errors. See Bundy v. Deland. 763
P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988). In sum, defendant has failed "'to show that the ends of justice
would be served by permitting the redetermination of the ground.'" Hurst. 777 P.2d at
1037 (quoting Sanders v. United States. 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963)). Essentially, defendant's
motion "merely recited those arguments made by Defendant on other occasions, and
represents an attempt to keep his case alive indefinitely." (R. 286). Accordingly, the
lower court properly dismissed the motion because defendant's claims were repetitive and
not predicated on good cause.3

3

The lower court in part concluded that defendant's motion to withdraw was time
barred due to the statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107
(1996). The State concedes that section 78-35a-107 applies only to petitions for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 et. seq. (1996).
However, it is well-settled that courts may affirm the rulings of a lower court on any
appropriate ground, although the lower court may have relied on another ground. See
State v. Heaton. 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 19,22 (Utah 1998); DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d
428, 444 (Utah 1995); State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985).
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW AS FRIVOLOUS AND
WITHOUT MERIT
In denying defendant's motion to withdraw, the lower court ruled that the
motion was frivolous and unsupported by the record. Essentially, the lower court found
that the trial court's actions did not render defense counsel ineffective at trial, and that such
a contention was frivolous on its face. This court reviews the lower court's determination
for correctness. Wright. 886 P.2d at 60.
A. Validity of Defendant's Guilty Plea
In Utah, "a plea's presumption of validity is strong." State v. Thurston, 781
P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah App. 1989) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court's refusal
to dismiss a guilty plea although the defendant expected a lighter sentence than he
received). In this case, the record establishes that the defendant was fully apprized of the
consequences of his plea and that the judge fulfilled his duty in ensuring defendant's
knowledge and understanding of the plea.
Defendant signed the "Statement of Defendant Regarding Plea Bargain
Certificates of Counsel and Order" [hereinafter "plea affidavit"] (R. 23). This affidavit,
with each statement initialed by the defendant, expressly acknowledged that he was
aware that any charge or sentencing concessions
or recommendations for probation or suspended
18

sentences, included a reduction of the charges
for sentencing made or sought by either defense
counsel or the prosecutor are not binding on the
Court and may or may not be approved or
followed by the Court.
(R. 27) (Emphasis in original). Defendant, recognizing the potential for a sentence that
differed from the plea agreement, entered a conditional plea, allowing him to rescind the
guilty plea if the court imposed a sentence of death. Defendant also affirmed that he had
reviewed, initialed, and signed the plea affidavit (R. 51-52). Defendant has proffered no
evidence to establish that he did not understand the plea affidavit or that the court did not
adequately assure itself of defendant's voluntary consent.
The trial court correctly followed the mandates of rule 11(e), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, in allowing defendant to plead guilty. The court assured that
defendant was represented by an attorney (R. 47) and that the defendant acted freely and
voluntarily, with a full understanding of the plea agreement (R. 53). Additionally, the trial
court instructed defendant of the constitutional rights he was waiving (R. 49); assured that
defendant understood the elements of the crime he was pleading to and the prosecution's
burden of proving those elements (R. 47-49); and discussed the plea agreement with
defendant (R. 52).
Defendant, however, maintains that the trial court erred by failing to advise
him as to the potential consequences of the plea. This assertion is directly refuted by the
record and was properly dismissed by the post-conviction court. Rule 11(e)(5) requires
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the court to find that "the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed
for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5). At sentencing, the trial court explicitly
informed defendant that homicide is punishable by life imprisonment or death (R. 50).
The court warned defendant of this possibility several times, and even provided defendant
with a 'sneak preview' of the future sentence — informing defendant that he "most likely
~ most definitely will sentence [defendant] to serve the rest of [his] life in the Utah State
Prison" (R. 50, 52). The record clearly demonstrates that the trial court adequately
assured that defendant understood the consequences of his plea. The trial court informed
defendant of the only two statutorily prescribed sentences: death and life imprisonment.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206. Although the court did recommend a twenty-year term
before parole, the Board of Pardons, not the judge, retains the ultimate control in the
length of the sentence. See Labrum v. State Board of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902, 907 (Utah
1993) (finding that the trial judge does not fix the term of imprisonment, he only prescribes
the statutory-based term of years.) See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (1996).
Furthermore, the post-conviction court determined that the trial judge's
sentencing recommendation was immaterial (Addendum B, if 18 at 4). Regardless of
whether the sentencing judge followed the expectations of defendant, "it is the Board of
Pardons, not the district court," that has the authority to determine the actual time served.
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Rawlingsv. Holden. 869 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah App. 1994); See also Footev. Utah Board
of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991).
The record directly refutes defendant's allegation that the trial court failed
to protect defendant's constitutional rights when it accepted defendant's guilty plea.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the lower court's denial of defendant's motion to
withdraw.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective during the plea and
sentencing proceedings. Again, defendant's allegations should be precluded because they
were raised, adjudicated, and dismissed in previous proceedings. In his post-conviction
proceedings, defendant fully litigated his claims of ineffective counsel. The postconviction court found that trial counsel correctly advised defendant of the consequences
of the plea and informed defendant that the Board of Pardons would ultimately decide the
length of time defendant would serve. (R. 218; Addendum B, % 17 at 3). The postconviction court also determined that trial counsel's representation was more than
adequate, and that defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's performance.
(Addendum B, 1 3 at 6). Defendant has not provided adequate unusual circumstances
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"sufficient to bar relitigation on that ground." Hurst. 777 P.2d at 1037.4 Nevertheless the
lower court properly rejected defendant's claims on the merits.
In order to succeed on his claims of ineffective counsel, defendant must
demonstrate that: (1) specific acts or omission fall outside the wide range of professional
competent assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of
the proceeding. Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995) (citing Strickland. 466
U.S. at 687). Defendant must show that trial counsel's representation "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness," yet even so, the court will not second guess the
counsel's strategic choices, even if they appear flawed. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 688-89.
There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance "fell within the wide range of
professional assistance." IcL See also State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993);
State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
The post-conviction court found that trial counsel provided effective service.
(Addendum B, K 3 at 6). The lower court in the present motion appropriately concurred
(R. 284-85). The record demonstrates that trial counsel reasonably represented defendant
and informed defendant of the consequences of pleading guilty. Defendant has failed to
offer any new evidence (other than legal advice from jailhouse lawyers) sufficient to doubt
the validity of these prior adjudication. For the first time on appeal, defendant raises

4

Defendant has also failed to allege or demonstrate why his ineffectiveness claims
are not barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
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several unsupported allegations of ineffective trial counsel.5 Among these, defendant
generally argues that trial counsel did not have a certain level of legal experience (Brief
of App. at 45).6 Although rule 8, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, now sets minimum
standards for counsel in capital appellate cases, at the time of defendant's trial, the only
applicable standard governing competence of counsel in such contexts was Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-32-1(2) (1987) (requiring a county to "[a]fford timely representation by competent
legal counsel"). See also Taylor, 905 P.2d at 282 (holding that rule 8 does not apply to
cases adjudicated prior to its enactment). Consequently, trial counsel's effectiveness can
only be evaluated through the record, which indicates a commendable effort. Moreover,
defendant has not raised sufficient evidence to counter the post-conviction court's
determination that defendant's purpose in pleading was to avoid the death penalty, and that
defendant would have pleaded guilty whether he was aware of the sentence
recommendation or not. (Addendum B, 1 13 at 3; 1 25-26 at 5).

5

Issues that have not been raised in the lower court cannot be raised on appeal
for the first time. See Stewart v. Utah Public Service Com'n. 885 P.2d 759, 781 (Utah
1994); State v. Aase. 762 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Utah App. 1988). Moreover, courts
"cannot speculate on the existence of facts that do not appear in the record. When
crucial matters are not in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the
action of the trial court." State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985).
6

To support this allegation, defendant refers to the retroactive application of the
'rule' created in State v. Holland. 876 P.2d 357 (Utah 1994) which "requires any
attorney appointed in a capital case to have a minimum level of experience." (Brief of
App. at 45). The State is unable to find any such retroactive requirement in the cited
legal precedent.
23

Defendant's claims, therefore, fail both prongs of the Strickland test: he has
shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice. Accordingly, the lower court properly
rejected defendant's claims as meritless.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing demonstrates that the lower court properly rejected defendant's
motion to withdraw as successive and without merit. Accordingly, the State respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the lower court's ruling.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this {j^

day of July, 1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

ANGELA F. MICKLOS
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
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.day of July, 1998 to:

Tracey Eugene Smith
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
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Addenda

Addendum A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDIC
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF

AUG 25 1997
[STRICT

MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 631

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court this date on the petitioner's Motion and Order for
Appointment of Legal Counsel. The petitioner moves the Court for appointment of legal
counsel to be paid by Beaver County and to pursue petitioner's most recent motion to
withdraw his plea.
The defendant was convicted of murder upon his plea of guilty on November 14, 1988.
Thereafter in December 1991, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after
having lost his direct appeal rights by inaction. The Court denied the request to withdraw the
guilty plea and the matter was pursued by appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
On December 27, 1993, the Supreme Court issued its opinion addressing the claims raised by
the defendant, including the letter written by this Court to the Board of Pardons recommending
that the defendant serve at least 20 years. The trial court's denial of the Motion to Withdraw
the plea was upheld. Thereafter the defendant herein filed a motion for an order of the Court
correcting the sentence which Mr. Smith claimed was illegal. The Court issued a
Memorandum Opinion on July 19, 1996, in which the defendant's motion was denied. That

-2determination was appealed. On April 3, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum
Opinion upholding the decision of the trial court.
In addition Mr. Smith filed in the 3rd-District Court the case of Smith v. Galetka. Case
No. 930900217, which was a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. In that case Mr. Smith
raised additional claims as to the propriety of the taking of his plea. The trial court ruled
against Mr. Smith in that case, and Mr. Smith did not appeal.

MOTION TO APPOINT LEGAL COUNSEL
On July 28, 1997, Mr. Smith filed yet another Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and
Correct Illegal Sentence. He now seeks to have this Court appoint counsel to represent him
and proposes to require the County of Beaver to pay the costs of that Motion and the
subsequent proceedings.
Under the provisions of 78-35a-101 UCA, et. Seq.. the Court has authority only to
appoint pro bono counsel. There is no provision for appointments paid by the county where
the conviction occurred.
This Court apparently has discretion as to whether or not to appoint counsel. (See 7835a-109 UCA) Although this is a serious case for the petitioner in view of the long period of
confinement which he is undergoing, the Court is of the opinion that Mr. Smith has had
several opportunities to raise the issues which he thought were appropriate relating to his entry
of his plea of guilty in this case. The Court can see no reason to appoint counsel in this case
and hereby declines to do so.

-3Section 78-35a-109 UCA requires the court to consider two factors in deciding whether
to appoint pro bono counsel. The court has considered those factors. This case raises only
one issue, ie: whether the defendant can withdraw his plea of guilty. Defendant alleges that
this court failed to comply with the provisions of Rule 11, U.R.Crim.P. There is no need for
an evidentiary hearing as the issues can be decided from the transcripts and records of the
taking of the plea. In addition, in view of the provisions of 78-35a-106 UCA and 78-35a-107
UCA, this court will be dismissing and denying the Motion because the Statute of Limitations
period has passed and the claim raised by the defendant in this motion was raised and
addressed in previous appeal proceedings, or should have been, or was raised and addressed in
previous post conviction relief proceedings, or should have been.
The issues do not appear complicated and there is no need for an evidentiary hearing.
Thus the appointment of pro bono counsel is not warranted.
The petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Legal Counsel is denied.

MOTIQN TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE
On August 4, 1997, Mr. Smith filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for
Hearing on his most recent motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The Court declines to set the
matter for oral argument. The Court has read the Motion submitted by Mr. Smith and the
affidavits included herewith. Mr. Smith challenges the entry of the plea in this case on the
grounds that he was not advised that the recommendations of the prosecution and his own
attorney were not binding upon the Court.

-4Defendant has had repeated opportunities to raise this issue, including a prior motion to
withdraw his plea. There is no new evidence alleged by defendant. The limitations period for
post-conviction relief has passed. (See 78-35a-107 UCA)
Pursuant to Rule 65B(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this court now finds that this
motion is frivolous, repetitive and without merit. In addition, it is unsupported by the records
of the plea.
Accordingly for the reasons set out above, the Motion is denied.
DATED this 21st day of August 1997.

J. PHILIP EVES, District Court Judge

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of August 1997,1 mailed true and correct copies
of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Leo G. Kanell, Esq.
Beaver County Attorney
P.O. Box 471
Beaver, UT 84713
Tracy E. Smith
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Jan Graham, Esq.
Utah Attorney General
P.O. Box 140856
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856

Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk

Addendum B

NOV 22 1993
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TRACY EUGENE SMITH,
Petitioner,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

v.

:

HANK GALETKA, UTAH STATE
PRISON, AND STATE OF UTAH

:

Case No.

:

Judge David S. Young

Respondents.

930900217 HC

Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus came before
the Court for an evidentiary hearing August 26, 1993, the Honorable
David

S. Young

presiding.

Petitioner

represented by Craig S. Cook.

was

present

and

was

Respondents were represented by

Angela F. Micklos and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Assistant Attorneys
General.

Witnesses from out of town and out of State being

present, the Court proceeded to hear the merits of the petition and
reserved ruling on the State's motion to dismiss on procedural
grounds.

After

hearing

testimony,

receiving

evidence,

and

considering counsels1 arguments, the Court enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November 14, 1988, petitioner pled guilty to first

degree murder, a capital offense.

The trial court sentenced

petitioner to life imprisonment.
2.

The trial court recommended that petitioner spend at

least 20 years in prison prior to being considered for parole.
3.

During

his

criminal

proceedings,

petitioner

was

represented by James Shumate.
4.

Mr. Shumate did not object to the trial court's 20-year

recommendation.
5.

Mr. Shumate did not request a presentence investigation

report.
6.

Based

reasonably

on

all

believed

that

available
a

information,

presentence

report

Mr.

Shumate

would

detail

petitioner's prior crimes, and on balance, would be a negative
factor in the sentencing decision.
7.

Petitioner presented no evidence that the presentence

report would have contained mitigating information.
8.

Mr.

Shumate

did

not

call

mitigating

witnesses

at

petitioner's sentencing hearing.
9.

Petitioner presented no evidence of what testimony any

mitigating witnesses would have given, had they been called at the
sentencing hearing.
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10.

At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Shumate did not make a

statement on petitioner's behalf, having previously argued all
mitigating

factors

to

the

Court

in

chambers

during

a plea

conference.
11.

Petitioner made a statement on his own behalf, prior to

being sentenced.
12.

Prior to being sentenced, petitioner knew that he faced

a maximum of life imprisonment.
13.

By entering a guilty plea, petitioner avoided the death

penalty, which was his primary objective in pleading guilty.
14.

A condition of the plea bargain was that petitioner would

have been able to withdraw his plea if the trial court had imposed
the death penalty.
15.

Mr. Shumate correctly advised petitioner that the Court

would almost certainly impose a sentence up to and including life
imprisonment.
16.

Mr. Shumate opined to petitioner that he might spend five

to seven years in prison.
17.

Mr. Shumate correctly advised petitioner that the length

of time he would actually serve in prison was under the exclusive
control of the Board of Pardons, which would be greatly influenced
by petitioner's conduct while in prison.
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18.

The trial judge's 20-year recommendation is not a major

factor relied on by the Board of Pardons in setting parole
rehearing dates.

Such recommendations are accorded greater or

lesser weight depending upon their factual support.

The judge's

recommendation here was based solely on the facts of the crime
itself.
19.

Defendants who have pled guilty to the capital offense of

first degree murder ordinarily receive 20 to 25 year rehearing
dates from the Board of Pardons.
20.

On November 12, 1991f petitioner went before the Utah

Board of Pardons for an original parole grant hearing. Petitioner
was given a rehearing date of October, 2008.
21.
setting

The Board of Pardons stated in writing its reasons for
a

20-year

rehearing

date.

The

reasons

included

petitioner's prison misconduct, but did not include the judge's
recommendation.
22.

Petitioner has the right to petition the Board of Pardons

for an earlier rehearing date.
23.
upon

The State's case against petitioner was strong, based

eyewitness

testimony

and

the

testimony

of petitioner's

companion, Timothy Miller.
24.

Mr. Shumate testified that petitioner confessed to him

that his purpose in approaching the victim was to obtain money, by
4

violent means if necessary, and that he shot the victim without
provocation.
25.

Had

petitioner

known

that

the

judge

was going

to

recommend 20 years incarceration, petitioner might still have pled
guilty.
26.

Petitioner never testified that but for his counsel's

alleged deficiencies, petitioner would not have pled guilty but
would have insisted upon going to trial.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel, petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, both that Mr. Shumate's performance

fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness, and that petitioner was
prejudiced by any unreasonable representation.

See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
2.

In order to meet the prejudice prong, petitioner must

demonstrate

that

but

for Mr. Shumate's

errors,

there

is a

reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable
sentence and rehearing date.

With respect to petitioner's claim

that his plea was involuntary due to Mr. Shumate's ineffectiveness,
petitioner must demonstrate that but for Mr. Shumate's error,
petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
upon going to trial. See Strickland, supra;
5

Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52 (1985).
3.

Mr. Shumate's representation was more than adequate; it

did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
4.

Even if Mr. Shumate committed error, petitioner has

failed to demonstrate prejudice.
5.

Petitioner was well aware when he pled guilty that he

faced a life sentence.
6.

The

trial court had only three

sentencing options:

probation, life imprisonment, and the death penalty.
7.

Petitioner has failed to show that he would have received

a lesser sentence if Mr. Shumate had requested a presentence
investigation

report,

called mitigating witnesses, or made a

statement on petitioner's behalf at sentencing.
8.

The Board of Pardons is not bound by the trial court's

20-year recommendation. There is no support for petitioner's claim
that, had Mr. Shumate objected to the 20-year recommendation,
petitioner would have received a lesser sentence and/or an earlier
rehearing date.
ORDER
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED as follows:

The petition for habeas corpus or post-

conviction relief is denied.
6
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State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 960689-CA

Tracy Eugene Smith,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
( A p r i l 3 , 1997)

Fifth District, Beaver Department
The Honorable J. Philip J. Eves
Attorneys:

Tracy Eugene Smith, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
Jan Graham and Barnard N. Madsen, Salt Lake City, and
Leo G. Kanell, Beaver, for Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Wilkins, and Jackson.
PER CURIAM:
Most, if not all of the issues, Smith raises in his present
appeal were resolved in 1993 when the Third District Court in
Smith v. Galetka. Case No. 930900217, denied Smith's petition for
writ of habeas corpus, which Smith did not appeal.
Even if we address the merits of whether the trial court's
20 year recommendation was appropriate, Smith1s argument
fails.
According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-13(5) (a) (1994), w[i]n all
cases where an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the judge
imposing the sentence shall within 30 days from the date of the
sentence, mail to the chief executive of the board [of pardons] a
statement in writing setting out the term for which, in his
opinion, the offender sentenced should be imprisoned
. . ."
Since Smith's life sentence is indeterminate,1 the trial judge
was required to make the recommendation to which Smith now
1. According to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-4 (1994)# M l ) Whenever a
person is convicted of a crime and the judgment provides for a
commitment to the state prison, the court shall not fix a
definite term of imprisonment unless otherwise provided by law.
(2) The sentence and judgment of imprisonment shall be for an
indeterminate term of not less than the minimum and not to exceed
the maximum term provided by law for the particular crime."

objects. And, even though the trial court is required to make a
recommendation, the Board of Pardons is not bound by it and has
discretion to determine the length of sentence it deems
appropriate. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (Supp. 1996); Rawlinas
v. Holden. 869 P.2d 958, 960-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
Smith also argues that section 77-27-13 (5) (a), requiring the
trial court to give its opinion regarding the length of time a
sentenced offender should be imprisoned, is unconstitutional.
However, we reject this claim because Smith makes it for the
first time on appeal and has failed to prove extraordinary
circumstances or that the trial court committed plain error.

State v, Archamceau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah ct. App. 1991) .
dingly, the trial court is affirmed.

Michael J. Wilkins,
Associate Presiding Judge

Noirman H. Jacksojj^ Judge
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